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 Introduction 
 
Tax competition between countries is a widely studied phenomenon in the public 
economics literature. Following up on the seminal paper by Mintz and Tulkens (1986), an 
extensive literature has been developed; important contributions include, among many 
others, Kanbur and Keen (1993), Wilson (1999), Janeba (2000), Zodrow (2003), Keen 
and Kotsogiannis (2003), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Borck and Pflüger (2006). 
The typical approach in these studies is to study the properties of the Nash equilibrium 
solution to the tax setting game, and to analyze the deviations from revenue or welfare 
maximizing behavior. This literature has convincingly shown that commodity or capital 
tax competition leads to inefficient tax setting behavior, and that the associated welfare 
losses may be large1.  
Recently, tax and capacity competition has also been intensively studied in the 
transport economics literature. Simple parallel and serial transport networks have been 
considered in which different toll and capacity decisions for the different links of the 
network are made by different authorities (see, e.g., Levinson (2001), de Palma and 
Lindsey (2000), De Borger, Proost and Van Dender (2005), De Borger; Dunkerley and 
Proost (2007, 2008), and Ubbels and Verhoef (2008)). Several lessons can be drawn from 
this literature. First, toll competition between regions or countries implies that, 
independent of the network structure, tolls on through traffic will be inefficiently high. 
Second, competition between regions leads to too much capacity in parallel networks, 
whereas regions will substantially under-invest in serial transport corridors. In fact, if 
countries can toll through traffic, numerical analysis suggests that toll and capacity 
competition results in such a dramatic degree of tax exporting and underinvestment in 
capacity that it may be beneficial for a higher level government not to allow individual 
regions to toll at all (De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007)). Third, tax exporting 
behavior holds both under a Nash and Stackelbergh approach to strategic interaction 
between regions (Ubbels and Verhoef (2008)).   
                                                 
1 However, given the large effects on tax rates typically found, some empirical studies have observed that 
the welfare effects of tax competition are, at least under some sets of parameter values, surprisingly small 
(see, e.g., Sorensen (2000) or Parry (2003)).   
2
 With few exceptions, the above literature has studied tax competition assuming 
non-cooperative behavior between regions or countries2. This is somewhat surprising. It 
is well known that in the private sector firms have strong incentives to cooperate in at 
least some aspects of their decision-making3, and one expects these incentives to be at 
least as strong in the case of competition between regions or countries. After all, the 
inability to write legal and binding contracts – one of the main reasons for the type of 
Nash competition typically assumed – is probably less pronounced in the case of national 
or regional governments than it is for private firms. Hence, the prisoner’s dilemma is 
much less likely to prevent cooperation than in the private sector.  
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to study competition between regions in a 
framework that allows for partial or full cooperation between regional governments. For 
purposes of concreteness, the model is framed in a setting of toll and investment 
competition between regions along a serial transport corridor. This focus on the transport 
sector is no coincidence. First, the fact that transport decisions involve both long-run 
(e.g., capacity) and short-run (e.g., prices, tolls) decisions implies substantial potential for 
partial cooperation. Second, in practice, cooperation and bargaining are observed to be 
important characteristics of national or regional decision-making in pricing and 
investment4. The importance of pure transit traffic and the high congestion levels 
observed in many European countries not only implies that any country’s decision on 
tolls or capacities has international implications, but it also placed congestion problems 
high on the political agenda. Frequent international contacts between top politicians then 
make negotiated outcomes quite realistic. The same holds at the local, urban level. Many 
large urban areas throughout Europe have massive commuting by non-urban residents 
towards the city center. City and regional governments make decisions on investment and 
                                                 
2 One recent exception is Han and Leach (2008). In their model, competing governments bargain with 
individual firms over financial incentives to attract them to their jurisdiction. They show that this individual 
bargaining framework yields results that differ substantially from the standard tax competition model. 
Under some specifications of the model tax competition does not imply capital misallocation. The Han-
Leach paper is totally unrelated to the bargaining model of the current paper.    
3 See, for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Fershtman and Muller (1986), Brod and 
Shivakumar (1999), and Savanes, Steen and Sorgard (2003). 
4 Of course, the nature of cooperation depends on the type of problem and may cover a wide range of 
policies. For example, financing concerns and relative benefits often drive negotiations over cross-border 
infrastructure projects (e.g., the discussion about deepening of the river Scheldt between Belgium and the 
Netherlands).    
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 potential tolling of city access. Negotiating about the distribution of potential future toll 
revenues is often an important ingredient of the political discussion between cities and 
regional or national authorities.   
We study a two-stage model of toll and investment decisions by regions along a 
serial network, as in De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007) and Ubbels and Verhoef 
(2008). Both investment in ‘quality’ (e.g., maintenance) and capacity (e.g., extra lanes) 
are considered. Unlike previous papers, we allow for partial cooperation between regions. 
Following Pauwels and Kort (2008), partial cooperation is modeled as a Nash bargaining 
problem with endogenous disagreement points. This setup assumes that regions can 
strategically use quality or capacity investments to strengthen their bargaining position 
prior to negotiating over toll levels and the distribution of the total payoff5. The model 
assumes that countries cooperate at the tolling stage and negotiate over the distribution of 
the payoff knowing that, if no bargaining agreement is reached, they fall back at the Nash 
equilibrium of the non-cooperative tolling game. At the capacity stage of the game, 
countries compete in order to ensure a better bargaining position and to get a larger share 
of the net payoff. 
Findings of this paper include the following. First, in a model of toll and quality 
choices, we show that regions’ relative bargaining positions are independent of 
congestion; they positively depend on the cost of quality. In other words, the region 
where the cost of quality is higher has the strongest position. Second, considering a 
model of toll and capacity decisions we find that a region’s pre-bargaining position 
negatively depends on both the intensity of congestion (more specifically, on the slope of 
the congestion function) and on the cost of capacity. Third, partial cooperation implies 
lower tolls and higher quality and capacity investment than under the full Nash 
equilibrium in both tolling and investment. Finally, Nash bargaining yields higher 
                                                 
5 In a recent extension of models of semi-collusion in industrial organization (see, e.g., Brod and 
Shivakumar (1999)), Pauwels and Kort (2008) consider a model where in the first stage firms spend on 
R&D in a Nash competitive setting while, at the second stage, they bargain over the distribution of joint 
profits. The outcome of the Nash bargaining game in outputs is considered as the threat point. They show 
that investment in the first stage is motivated by: (i) raising joint profits at the second stage; (ii) 
strengthening the bargaining position. They consider semi-collusion, full cooperation at both stages, full 
competition (i.e., a Nash game is played at both stages), and they provide some introductory comparative 
analysis.  
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 welfare than full Nash competition. Partial cooperation therefore partially resolves the 
problem of welfare losses associated with fierce toll and capacity competition pointed out 
in the recent literature (see, e.g., De Borger et al. (2007)).  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present an 
intuitive introduction to the Nash bargaining approach used in this paper. Section 2 
studies two models of road transport investment (‘quality’ and ‘capacity’, to be defined 
more precisely below), assuming the objective of regions is to maximize toll revenues. 
We compare the results of partial cooperation with those obtained in the Nash 
equilibrium in both tolls and qualities or capacities. In Section 3, we extend the model to 
a setting in which regions are not only interested in net toll revenues but also care about 
the welfare of road users. Section 4 provides a simple numerical example. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
     
1. Cooperation and Nash bargaining in toll-capacity games: some preliminaries  
 
Nash (1950) suggested an axiomatic approach to cooperative games in which 
parties cooperate in maximizing the total joint payoff, but where bargaining takes place 
over the distribution of this payoff. The Nash bargaining solution implies that parties 
receive a share of the total payoff that is determined by their relative ‘disagreement’ 
levels, defined as the payoffs they receive if cooperation fails.  
In general, a Nash bargaining problem is defined by a pair ( , ( , ))A BF d d , where F 
is the set of feasible payoffs of the two players, and ( , )A Bd d  is the disagreement point. 
Let the set F of feasible combinations be defined by 
{ }2( , )A B A BF Rϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ∈ + ≤  
where ,A Bϕ ϕ  are the payoffs for region A and B, respectively, and ϕ  is the maximal 
value of the total payoff that can be achieved by cooperation. Note that the feasible set 
describes all possible combinations of dividing ϕ between the two players. Nash shows 
that the solution to the bargaining problem yields the following payoffs for players A and 
B, respectively: 
5
  
{ }
{ }
0.5
0.5
A B
B A
d d
d d
ϕ
ϕ
+ −
+ −
 
Intuitively, the bargaining solution implies that each player receives half of the joint total 
payoff if their fallback positions are the same; if this is not the case, the player with the 
more favorable bargaining position gets more than half. 
In this paper, we study partial cooperation as a Nash bargaining problem in the 
following concrete setting. Assume there are two regions, A and B, located along a serial 
transport corridor. Assume for simplicity that all traffic passes through the two regions 
and that there is no traffic just traveling in one of the regions6. Moreover, we consider a 
single direction. Figure 1 illustrates the situation. Total demand is denoted by X. The 
regions have each two policy instruments and face a two stage decision process: they 
have to decide on a short-run variable ( , )it i A B= (e.g., tolls) and a long-run variable 
( , )iq i A B=  (e.g., road capacity). Note that the description illustrated by Figure 1, 
although very simple, does capture the basics of a number of realistic problems. For 
example, it describes toll and capacity competition between countries that suffer to a 
large extent from through traffic (see De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007)). 
Alternatively, it provides a simplified description of a city and a surrounding region; 
commuters travel from the region into the city every morning. The city and the regional 
government have to make decisions on road investment and on toll access charges into 
the city center (Ubbels and Verhoef (2008)).    
 
 
   Traffic Flow X 
 
 
Region A      Region B 
 
Figure 1: A simple serial transport corridor 
                                                 
6 Introducing local transport in both regions, which is obviously more realistic, complicates the model 
dramatically without yielding much extra insight.  
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   Within this setting, an intuitive description of the approach taken in this paper is 
as follows. Let the objective functions (this can be toll revenue, welfare, etc.) in regions 
A and B be written in general as functions of tolls and investment levels in both regions, 
respectively: 
( , , , ), ( , , , )A A B A B B A B A Bt t q q t t q qϕ ϕ .  
Although other configurations could be conceived7, we assume in this paper that regions 
cooperate at the tolling stage and negotiate over the distribution of payoffs. However, 
following Pauwels and Kort (2008) -- and unlike the original bargaining problem -- it is 
assumed that the disagreement levels of the bargaining problem are not exogenous, but 
are endogenously determined by regions’ strategic investment behavior. Specifically, 
regions know that, if no bargaining agreement is reached, they fall back at the Nash 
equilibrium of the non-cooperative tolling game. This disagreement point, however, can 
be manipulated by regions’ investment decisions. At the investment stage of the game, 
countries therefore compete in order to ensure a better bargaining position and to get a 
larger share of the net payoffs of the policy. The Nash bargaining model considered here 
then implies that, on the one hand, regions have an incentive to determine investment to 
maximize their joint total payoff but, on the other hand, by threatening to play non-
cooperatively, they also use investment decisions to secure a better bargaining position 
when negotiating about the distribution of the joint payoff between regions.   
To model the process just described, at the tolling stage, regions maximize the 
joint total payoff, for given investment levels in the two regions: 
,
( , , , ) ( , , , )
A B
A A B A B B A B A Bt t
Max t t q q t t q qϕ ϕ+   
If negotiations fail, regions fall back at the disagreement point. This is the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium in tolls, yielding payoffs of ( , ), ( , )NE NEA A B B A Bq q q qϕ ϕ , 
respectively. This Nash equilibrium is obtained by assuming each region maximizes its 
                                                 
7 Indeed, partial cooperation could also take the form of cooperation at the investment stage and 
competition at the tolling stage, the opposite of what we assume here. The former could make a lot of sense 
in the case of cross-border infrastructure projects, where different countries cooperate on investment 
decisions but have non-cooperative tolling strategies. The case analyzed in this paper, viz. cooperation at 
the tolling stage and investment competition may be more plausible for the interaction between a city and 
regional government that cooperate when tolling city access, but have individual investment strategies. For 
a private sector application of a model of partial cooperation where cooperation is at the R&D stage and 
there is competition at the output stage, see dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988)).    
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 own payoff with respect to the toll it controls, treating investment levels and the toll level 
in the other region as exogenously given. The disagreement payoffs determine the 
strength of the bargaining positions in the investment game. In the second stage, 
capacities are determined non-cooperatively. Given Nash’s solution (1950) to the toll 
bargaining game, regions A and B can be assumed to determine investment so as to solve, 
respectively: 
{ }
{ }
*
*
( , ) 0.5 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) 0.5 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
A
B
NE NE
A A B A B A A B B A Bq
NE NE
B A B A B B A B A A Bq
Max q q q q q q q q
Max q q q q q q q q
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
= + −
= + −
 
 
The Nash bargaining concept used in this paper is illustrated on Figure 2. On the 
axes, we have the values of the payoff functions of the two regions. The set of all 
possible divisions of the maximal joint payoff  ( , )A Bq qϕ  is depicted by the linear relation 
with slope minus one. The disagreement point D is also indicated; the vertical and 
horizontal lines denote ( , )NEA A Bq qϕ and ( , )NEB A Bq qϕ , respectively. Finally, the Nash 
bargaining solution is given by the point G. The intuition of the model is clear. On the 
one hand, regions have an incentive, by appropriate investment, to raise the maximal joint 
payoff ( , )A Bq qϕ . This shifts the linear relation with slope minus one to the right. On the 
other hand, investment decisions affect the disagreement point, so regions use investment 
to ensure a better bargaining position and to get a larger share of the joint payoff. For 
example, if region A succeeds in shifting ( , )NEA A Bq qϕ to the right, point G moves to the 
right, reflecting a better outcome for A. 
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 ( , )A Bq qϕ  
( , )B A Bq qϕ     
 
 
      
 
 
          G 
 
 
 
 
( , )NEB A Bq qϕ  
 
   D 
 
 
   ( , )NEA A Bq qϕ      ( , )A A Bq qϕ  
 
 
Figure 2. The Nash bargaining solution.  
 
 
 
2. Nash bargaining with revenue maximizing governments 
 
In this section, we study Nash bargaining as partial cooperation in the two-stage 
toll-investment model described in Section 1, assuming that the regions’ payoffs are total 
(net of investment cost) toll revenues. We derive information on investment and toll 
9
 levels, and compare with the outcomes under full cooperation and fully non-cooperative 
behavior (i.e., Nash competition at both decision stages). 
We analyze the model for two different and highly stylized types of investment in 
transport infrastructure. One type of investment reduces the average cost of making a trip, 
independent of the traffic flow. Think of road pavement quality choice, road 
maintenance, highways lights, and traffic light coordination as stylistic examples. Better 
pavement quality reduces travel cost, independent of the traffic flow; the same holds for 
better maintained roads. We refer to this first type of investment as ‘quality’. The second 
type of investment is a ‘capacity’ expansion; the degree to which this reduces the cost of 
making a trip varies with the traffic flow using the road: the user cost reduction only 
materializes when there is more traffic. The cost at free flowing traffic levels is not 
affected.   
 
2.1. Maximizing toll revenues: toll and road quality choice under Nash bargaining 
 Regions make decisions on ‘quality’ (broadly defined, see above, but excluding 
pure capacity increases) and toll levels. They only care about toll revenues, net of 
investment expenses. We use simple demand and cost specifications throughout. Demand 
is linear and given by  
 ( )Xp X a bX= −                (1) 
Generalized cost functions are also assumed to be linear. To keep the analysis as tractable 
as possible, we specify the (net of toll) cost of making a trip of given distance in regions 
A and B as, respectively: 
 
( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
A A A A A
B B B B B
C X m m X
C X m m X
α β
α β
= − +
= − +                        (2) 
The average money plus time cost of making a trip is a linear function of the traffic flow 
X; the slopes of the cost functions ,A Bβ β  reflect the severity of extra traffic for 
congestion. Investment in road quality ( ,A Bm m ) is assumed to reduce the cost of making 
a trip independent of the traffic volume. It reduces the cost of free flowing traffic. We 
impose ( , )i im i A Bα< = .  
Given these specifications, user equilibrium requires: 
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 ( ) (.) (.)X A A B Bp X C t C t= + + +                        (3) 
This leads to the ‘reduced-form’ demand function for traffic as a function of tolls and 
qualities in both regions. We find: 
 ( ) ( )( , , , ) ,A B A A B BA B A B A B
a t m t mX t t m m N b
N
α α β β− − − − − −= = + +           (4) 
 
A. Nash bargaining 
As argued above, regions cooperate at the tolling stage and bargain over the 
distribution of total net revenues realizing that, when no agreement is reached, they fall 
back at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Prior to bargaining they use quality 
investments strategically as a way to secure a more powerful negotiating position.  
 
Nash bargaining: the tolling stage 
 
Regions maximize joint (net of maintenance expenditures) toll revenues:  
 [ ] 2 2
,
( ) ( , , , ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
A B
A B A B A B A A B Bt t
Max t t X t t m m m mγ γ+ − −     
where X(.) is reduced-form demand as given above. It is assumed that quality investment 
costs are quadratic in quality levels.  
Not surprisingly, given the structure of the problem the optimal tax rates are not 
separately identified. What matters for overall demand is just the total toll level for the 
whole trip. Using the reduced-form demand function the first-order condition 
immediately implies:  
( )A B A Bt t b Xβ β+ = + +                          (5) 
This immediately implies that the overall toll level exceeds the global marginal external 
congestion costs; the latter is easily seen to equal ( )A B Xβ β+ . Substituting demand (4) 
into (5) and working out, the total tax to pass through the two regions is given by: 
 
2
NB NB A B A B
A B
a m mt t α α− − + ++ =              (6)  
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 Joint toll levels are rising in road quality levels, but independent of congestion functions’ 
slope parameters. Combining (5) and (6), we see that optimal demand is rising in road 
quality but declining in congestion severity, as captured by the slope parameters: 
 
2 2( )
A B A B A B A B
A B
a m m a m mX
N b
α α α α
β β
− − + + − − + += = + +            (7) 
Total toll revenues net of capacity costs equal, after substituting in the objective function: 
        
2
2 21( , ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
2
A B A B
A B A A B B
A B
a m mm m m m
b
α αϕ γ γβ β
⎛ ⎞ − − + +⎡ ⎤= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
   (8) 
This is the overall optimal toll revenue minus investment costs in both regions; it 
obviously depends on investments in both regions.  
 
Nash bargaining: the disagreement point 
 
If regions do not succeed in attaining a bargained outcome which is acceptable to 
both parties, the outcome of the process is the region’s fallback position. This fallback or 
disagreement point is assumed to be the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in tolls. To 
analyze this disagreement level, note that country A solves: 
 [ ] 2( , , , ) 0.5 ( )
A
A A B A B A At
Max t X t t m m mγ−  
holding quality levels and toll levels in B constant. Country B behaves in a similar 
fashion. The reaction functions are: 
 2
2
A B A B B
A
A B A B A
B
a m m tt
a m m tt
α α
α α
− − + + −=
− − + + −=
              
Tolls in a region are declining in the toll level in the other region. Solving the set of 
reaction functions yields the unique (and stable: slopes equal -0.5) Nash equilibrium toll 
solution: 
 
3
NE NE A B A B
A B
a m mt t α α− − + += =              (9) 
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 The joint toll payment to travel through both regions exceeds the cooperative toll level, 
conditional on quality (compare (9) with (6)). The net revenue levels at the Nash 
disagreement points are, for regions A and B, respectively: 
 
2
2
2
2
1( , ) 0.5 ( )
3
1( , ) 0.5 ( )
3
NE A B A B
A A B A A
A B
NE A B A B
B A B B B
A B
a m mm m m
b
a m mm m m
b
α αϕ γβ β
α αϕ γβ β
⎛ ⎞ − − + +⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ − − + +⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
      (10) 
 
The pre-bargaining quality investment game  
 
Nash bargaining implies that region A, at the pre-bargaining stage, chooses its 
quality level so as to: 
 { }* 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2A
NE NE
A A B A B A A B B A B
m
Max m m m m m m m mϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= + −        (11)                     
The implicit assumption is that country A will get half of the total maximum joint 
revenues if both regions have equal bargaining strength. The strength of the bargaining 
position is captured by the relative revenues for the two regions at their respective Nash 
equilibrium disagreement points.  
Observe that region A can strategically use optimal quality investment at the pre-
bargaining stage to raise its bargaining position. Indeed, (10) implies: 
NE NE
A B
A A
A A
m
m m
ϕ ϕ γ∂ ∂− = −∂ ∂  
Interestingly, this means that region A strengthens its bargaining position by offering less 
road quality. Doing so has two effects: it reduces costs, raising region A’s net revenues at 
the fallback position; it also reduces demand for transport, but this affects the Nash 
equilibrium fallback position for A and B in an identical manner and, hence, does not 
affect relative bargaining strength. Conditional on a given quality, regions A’s bargaining 
power is also reduced when its quality cost increases.   
Using the specification of the various functions derived above (see (8) and (10)), 
the first order condition for A’s optimal quality choice problem (11) at the pre-bargaining 
stage implies the following reaction function, derived after simple algebra: 
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 1
4 1 4 1
A B
A B
A A
am m
N N
α α
γ γ
− −= +− −  
Reaction functions are upward sloping by the second-order conditions. If one country 
raises quality investment it pays for the other to do so as well in order to generate extra 
traffic and toll revenues. A similar problem is solved by B. Solving for the Nash 
equilibrium qualities yields: 
 
( )
4 ( )
( )
4 ( )
NB B A B
A
A B A B
NB A A B
B
A B A B
am
N
am
N
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − +
− −= − +
            (12)  
The joint toll level at the Nash bargaining solution is easily calculated, using (12) 
in expression (6). We obtain: 
2 ( )
4 ( )
NB NB A B A B
A B
A B A B
N at t
N
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −+ = − +            (13) 
Demand is given by, using (5) and (12):  
 2 ( )
4 ( )
NB A B A B
A B A B
aX
N
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − +              
Note that demand both directly determines congestion and overall consumer surplus for 
the users8. Finally, total joint revenues are: 
[ ] [ ]
2
2
( )1 8 ( )
2 4 ( )
NB A B A B
A B A B
A B A B
a N
N
γ γ α αϕ γ γ γ γγ γ γ γ
⎧ ⎫− −⎪ ⎪= − +⎨ ⎬− +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
        (14)  
 
  We are now in a position to study in more detail the determinants of the pre-
bargaining position for region A. To do so, let us substitute the optimal quality levels (12) 
into NE NEA Bϕ ϕ− , using (10). Working out, straightforward algebra shows that A’s position 
is stronger than B’s if and only if A Bγ γ> . This has two implications. First, surprisingly, 
the region with the highest cost parameter has the strongest position. The intuition is as 
follows. Expression (10) shows that quality choices do not matter for revenues (the first 
                                                 
8 Indeed, it is easily shown that the surplus of users, i.e., ( )
0
( ) (.)
X
X Xp z dz g X−∫ is directly proportional 
to demand squared. 
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 term on the right hand sides of (10) are identical for both regions) in this model, and the 
higher quality cost in region A induces it to offer a lower quality than B. This yields 
lower quality costs for region A, raising its net revenues and, hence, raising its bargaining 
power. The trade off for a region is this: if it invests more in quality, it raises total 
demand and joint toll revenues, but it also reduces its bargaining position, hence it gets 
less of a larger amount. Second, note that relative congestion parameters do not matter at 
all for bargaining positions.  
 
B. Full cooperation at both capacity and tolling stages 
It will be instructive to compare the Nash bargaining solution with the fully 
cooperative outcome. Suppose regions cooperate at both the tolling and quality stages. If 
the two countries cooperate at both stages, they maximize joint net toll revenues (8) with 
respect to both investment levels. Solving yields the optimal fully cooperative investment 
levels: 
( )
2 ( )
( )
2 ( )
FC B A B
A
A B A B
FC A A B
B
A B A B
am
N
am
N
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − −
− −= − −
           (15) 
Tolls at the full cooperative equilibrium are: 
[ ]( ) ( )
2
A B A BFC FC
A B
A B A B
N a
t t
N
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −+ = − −           (16) 
Demand is:  
[ ]( )
2
A B A BFC
A B A B
a
X
N
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − −                       (17) 
Total net toll revenues are: 
( )
2( )1
2 2
FC A B A B
A B A B
a
N
γ γ α αϕ γ γ γ γ
⎡ ⎤− −= ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
                     (18) 
 
C. Nash equilibrium in both tolls and quality: full competition 
Finally, let us compare with full non-cooperative behavior at both stages. If 
countries compete in both tolls and investment, then each region maximizes its Nash 
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 equilibrium profit, obtained for the Nash equilibrium tolls, conditional on quality 
investment levels. These were given by (10). Solving for the Nash equilibrium, we find 
the following capacities: 
2 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
2 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
NE B A B
A
A B A B
NE A A B
B
A B A B
am
N
am
N
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − −
− −= − −
           (19) 
Tolls at the Nash equilibrium are easily derived as: 
[ ]3 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
A B A BNE NE
A B
A B A B
N a
t t
N
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= = − −            (20) 
Moreover, demand is found to be: 
 [ ]3 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
A B A BNE
A B A B
a
X
N
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − −            (21) 
Finally, total net toll revenues are calculated to be: 
[ ]
[ ]
2( )
9 ( ) 2 2
A B A BNE
A B A B
a
N
γ γ α αϕ γ γ γ γ
− −= − −            (22) 
 
D. Comparison of regimes 
The various expressions for tolls, quality and demand are summarized in Table 1 
for the different regimes. Simple algebra then shows that the relations given in Table 2 
hold.  
Interpretation is straightforward. First, quality investment is highest under full 
cooperation, and it is higher under Nash Bargaining than under full competition. The 
reason that it is lower under bargaining than under full cooperation is that regions 
strategically provide lower quality to strengthen pre-their bargaining position when 
negotiating over net toll revenues. Second, the total toll to travel through regions A and B 
is highest under full competition. Interestingly, the total toll is lowest under Nash 
bargaining. Although full cooperation and bargaining imply the same toll rules, 
conditional on quality, investment in quality is higher under full cooperation. Higher 
quality implies higher overall tolls, see before. Demand (and hence congestion and 
consumer surplus) is highest under full cooperation, despite the fact that regions 
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 maximize net revenues. It is lowest under full competition. Finally, total net revenues 
under bargaining are higher than under full competition.  
  This leads to three clear conclusions. First, bargaining leads to more favorable 
outcomes than non-cooperative behavior: it yields lower tolls, higher quality, higher net 
consumer surplus and higher overall welfare9. Second, strategic use of quality investment 
does under bargaining imply that bargaining performs less favorable that full cooperation. 
Third, despite the fact that regions maximize net toll revenues, both partial and full 
cooperation are better for road users than non-cooperative behavior.  
                                                 
9 The nature of the model, involving bargaining and congestion externalities, implies that the results are 
more clear cut than in models of semi-collusion considered in the industrial organization literature. There it 
is often found that whether an output cartel (partial cooperation on the output market) is good for 
consumers and/or producers depends on the size of spillover effects of investment. See, e.g., Feshtman and 
Gandall (1994) and Brod and Shivakumar (1999).   
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 Table 1: summary of findings  
 Nash Bargaining (NB) Full cooperation (FC) Full Nash competition (N
Quality ( )
4 ( )
( )
4 ( )
NB B
A
A B A B
NB A
B
A B A B
Jm
N
Jm
N
γ
γ γ γ γ
γ
γ γ γ γ
= − +
= − +
 
( )
2 ( )
( )
2 ( )
FC B
A
A B A B
FC A
B
A B A B
Jm
N
Jm
N
γ
γ γ γ γ
γ
γ γ γ γ
= − −
= − −
 
2 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
2 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
NE B
A
A B A
NE A
B
A B A
Jm
N
Jm
N
γ
γ γ γ
γ
γ γ γ
= − −
= − −
Toll 
levels 
2 ( )
4 ( )
NB NB A B
A B
A B A B
N Jt t
N
γ γ
γ γ γ γ+ = − +  
[ ]( ) ( )
2
A BFC FC
A B
A B A B
N J
t t
N
γ γ
γ γ γ γ+ = − −  
[ ]6 (
9 ( ) 2
A BNE NE
A B
A B
N
t t
N
γ γ
γ γ γ+ = −
Demand 2 ( )
4 ( )
NB A B
A B A B
JX
N
γ γ
γ γ γ γ= − +  
[ ]( )
2
A BFC
A B A B
J
X
N
γ γ
γ γ γ γ= − −  
[ ]3 ( )
9 ( ) 2 2
A BNE
A B A
J
X
N
γ γ
γ γ γ= − −
Net 
revenues [ ][ ]
2
2
( ) 8 ( )1
2 4 ( )
A B A B A B
A B A B
J N
N
γ γ γ γ γ γϕ γ γ γ γ
⎧ ⎫− +⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬− +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭ ( )
2( )1
2 2
FC A B
A B A B
J
N
γ γϕ γ γ γ γ
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
[ ]
[
2( )
9 ( ) 2 2
A BNE
A B A
J
N
γ γϕ γ γ γ= − −
Note: ( )A BJ a α α= − −  
 
Table 2: Comparison between regimes 
 Comparison Nash 
bargaining (NB), 
full cooperation 
(FC) and Full Nash 
Competition (NE) 
Total toll NE>FC>NB 
Quality FC>NB>NE 
Demand,  
congestion, 
consumer surplus 
FC>NB>NE 
Net revenues FC>NB>NE 
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 2.2. Maximizing toll revenues: toll and capacity quality choice under Nash bargaining 
In this section, we reconsider the Nash bargaining problem in the case of toll-
capacity decisions, where capacity investment directly reduces congestion at given traffic 
levels. Since the methodology is entirely similar to that in the previous section, we 
concentrate on the main differences only. Details on the derivation are delegated to 
Appendix 1.  
Demand is again given by (1). However, following the theoretical transport 
literature (see, e.g., Small and Verhoef (2008), De Borger at al. (2007)), we assume the 
money plus time cost is a linear function of the volume-capacity ratio. For practical 
reasons (see De Palma and Leruth (1989)) it will be instructive to work in terms of 
inverse capacity AR . So we specify costs as:   
 
1( , ) ( ),
1( , ) ( ),
A A A A A A
A
B B B B B B
B
C X R XR R
K
C X R XR R
K
α β
α β
= + =
= + =
 
where capacities are denoted ,A BK K . Given these specifications and using user 
equilibrium condition (3), we find the reduced-form demand function for traffic as a 
function of tolls and capacities: 
 ( , , , ) ,A B A BA B A B A A B B
a t tX t t R R N b R R
N
α α β β− − − −= = + +   (23) 
  
A. Nash bargaining 
At the tolling, stage, regions maximize joint net toll revenues:  
 [ ]
,
1 1( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( )
A B
A B A B A B A Bt t
A B
Max t t X t t R R k k
R R
+ − −     
The first order conditions again imply that the joint toll level exceeds marginal external 
congestion cost, which is now captured by ( )A A B BR R Xβ β+ . The total tax to pass through 
the two countries is shown to be given by: 
 
2
NB NB A B
A B
at t α α− −+ =        (24) 
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 Interestingly, joint toll levels are independent of capacities and the congestion functions’ 
slope parameters (also see De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2008)). Optimal demand is  
 
2
A BaX
N
α α− −=   
Total toll revenues net of capacity costs equal, after substituting in the objective function: 
21 1 1( , ) ( ) ( )
2
A B
A B A B
A A B B A B
aR R k k
b R R R R
α αϕ β β
⎛ ⎞ − −⎡ ⎤= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
              (25) 
 
The disagreement Nash equilibrium tolls are easily shown to be: 
 
3
NE NE A B
A B
at t α α− −= =        (26) 
These are higher than the first-best tolls (see (24)). The net revenue levels at the Nash 
disagreement levels are, for given capacities: 
 
2
2
1 1( , ) ( )
3
1 1( , ) ( )
3
NE A B
A A B A
A A B B A
NE A B
B A B B
A A B B B
aR R k
b R R R
aR R k
b R R R
α αϕ β β
α αϕ β β
⎛ ⎞ − −⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ − −⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
   (27) 
 
To see the effect of investing more in capacity on region A’s pre-bargaining 
position, it follows from (27) that:  
2 0
NE NE
A B A
A A A
k
R R R
ϕ ϕ∂ ∂− = >∂ ∂ .          
As before, investing more (in capacity) reduces region A’s pre-bargaining position.  
Next, consider the pre-bargaining capacity game. Region A maximizes 
 { }* 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
NE NE
A A B A B A A B B A BR R R R R R R Rϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= + −  
with respect to inverse capacity AR . A similar objective function is used by B. The 
second-order conditions imply that the capacity reaction functions that follow from the 
20
 first-order conditions are again upward sloping10. Solving for the Nash equilibrium 
capacities leads to: 
 
( )
( )
22
2 2 2
22
2 2 2
A
ANB
A
A B A A B B
B
BNB
B
A B A A B B
kb
R
a k k
kb
R
a k k
β
α α β β
β
α α β β
= − − − +
= − − − +
     (28) 
  
Finally, consider again the relative bargaining position of region A. Substituting 
the inverse capacities (28) into (27), we find that:  
( 0NE NEA Bϕ ϕ− > ) iff A A B Bk kβ β< .        
This implies that A’s position is stronger if it is less congestion-prone and/or it has a 
lower capacity unit cost. Given the capacity cost function and optimal investment 
behavior, a lower capacity cost per unit implies lower overall capacity costs, hence higher 
net revenues. A less congestion-prone network means that for a given traffic volume less 
investment is needed, hence leading to higher net revenues at the disagreement level. 
Note that this differs from the relative bargaining position in the case of quality 
investment on two accounts: first, congestion does matter here, unlike with quality 
investment. Second, a lower capacity cost strengthens a region’s position now; the 
opposite was the case with quality investment.  
Optimal tolls were independent of capacities. Substituting optimal inverse 
capacities (28) in (25), total net toll revenues are found to be, after simple algebra: 
( ) 2( 2 2 ) ( ) ( 2 2 )
( , )
4
A B A A A A A B A A A ANB NB
A B
a k k a k k
R R
b
α α β β α α β βϕ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − + − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦=
 Finally, demand at the bargained solution is: 
 
( )2 2 2
2
A B A A B BNB
a k k
X
b
α α β β− − − +=            
                                                 
10 Specifically, write the first order condition as an implicit function of the two inverse capacities and use 
the implicit function theorem to derive the impact of inverse capacity in B on inverse capacity in A. The 
second-order condition implies that the denominator of the resulting expression is negative. This 
immediately implies the slope of the reaction function is positive.   
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B. Comparison of regimes 
In Appendix 1 we derive the results under full cooperation and full Nash 
competition for this model, using the same procedure as in section 2.1. We summarize 
the results obtained for the three regimes considered in Tables 3 and 4. The rankings in 
Table 4 are based on the expressions in Table 3 after straightforward, but sometimes 
rather extensive, algebra.  
Note that the rankings are the same as in the case of quality investment, except for 
the toll level. Therefore, bargaining yields more capacity, lower tolls, and both higher net 
toll revenues and more consumer benefits for road users than non-cooperative behavior.   
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 Table 3: Capacity investment comparison of regimes 
 Nash Bargaining (NB) Full cooperation (FC) Full Nash competition 
Capacities 
( )
( )
22
( ) 2 2 2
22
( ) 2 2 2
A
ANB
A
A A B B
B
BNB
B
A A B B
kb
R
J k k
kb
R
J k k
β
β β
β
β β
= − +
= − +
 
( )
( )
2
( ) 2
2
( ) 2
A
AFC
A
A A B B
B
BFC
B
A A B B
kb
R
J k k
kb
R
J k k
β
β β
β
β β
= − +
= − +
 
(
(
3
( ) 3
3
( ) 3
A
ANE
A
A A
B
BNE
B
A A
kb
R
J k
kb
R
J k
β
β
β
β
= − +
= − +
Toll 
levels 
( )
2
NB NB
A B
Jt t+ =  ( )
2
FC FC
A B
Jt t+ =  2( )
3
NE NE
A B
Jt t+ =  
Demand ( )( ) 2 2 2
2
A A B BNB
J k k
X
b
β β− += ( )( ) 2
2
A A B BFC
J k k
X
b
β β− +=  (( ) 3
3
A ANE
J k
X
b
β− +=
Note: ( ) A BJ a α α= − −  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison between regimes 
 Comparison Nash 
bargaining (NB), 
full cooperation 
(FC) and Full Nash 
Competition (NE) 
Total toll per trip NE>FC=NB 
Capacity FC>NB>NE 
Demand (and 
congestion, and 
consumer surplus) 
FC>NB>NE 
Net revenues FC>NB>NE 
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 3. Nash bargaining with a welfare maximizing government 
 
In this section, we extend the model to allow for welfare maximizing 
governments. As our purpose is to point out the main differences with revenue 
maximizing behavior, we consider the simplest possible setup to illustrate the 
implications of taking into account the welfare of road users. Let us, therefore, interpret 
the two-region model as in Ubbels and Verhoef (2008). Region A is the city, region B is 
the surrounding region. Suppose all traffic in both A and B comes from commuters that 
travel from B to A. In such a setting is quite realistic to assume that region B cares about 
its commuting inhabitants. As there is no local traffic in the city, region A is assumed not 
to care about commuter welfare. So the respective welfare functions that we use are: 
2
2
0
0.5 ( )
( ) ( ) 0.5 ( )
A A A A
X
X X
B B B B
W t X m
W p z dz g X X t X m
γ
γ
= −
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦∫  
Here ( ) ( ) ( )X A A A A B B B Bg X X m t X m tα β α β= + + − + + + − is the total generalized cost 
(inclusive of toll payments) for a commuting trip. Demand is, as before, given by (4). We 
again consecutively consider quality and capacity investment (sections 3.1 and 3.2, 
respectively). To avoid too much repetition, we concentrate on the main differences with 
the previous section.  
 
3.1. Maximizing welfare: toll and road quality choice under Nash bargaining 
 
A. Nash bargaining 
At the tolling stage, regions maximize joint welfare:  
 
,
( , , , ) ( , , , )
A B
A A B A B B A B A Bt t
Max W t t m m W t t m m+     
Using the first-order conditions, it easily follows that the total tax to pass through the two 
regions equals the first best marginal external congestion cost:  
 ( )NB NBA B A Bt t Xβ β+ = +  
In other words, the toll rule is first-best, conditional on demand. Using (4) we have: 
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  [ ]
2 2
NB NB A B
A B A B A B
A A
t t a m m
b
β β α αβ β
++ = − − + ++ +          (29) 
Simple algebra shows that the toll level rises in quality and in the congestion functions’ 
slope parameters. Note that, for given quality levels, tolls are below those under revenue 
maximizing governments (compare with (6)). Optimal demand is  
 
2 2
NB A B A B
A B
a m mX
b
α α
β β
− − + += + +   
Total welfare is, after substituting in the objective function: 
2
2 2( )( , ) 0.5 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
2 2
A B A B
A B A A B B
A B
a m mW m m m m
b
α α γ γβ β
− − + += − −+ +       (30) 
 
The disagreement point is the Nash equilibrium in tolls. Country A solves: 
 [ ] 2( , , , ) 0.5 ( )
A
A A B A B A At
Max t X t t m m mγ−  
holding quality levels and toll levels in B constant. As before, the first-order conditions 
imply that region A charges, conditional on demand, more than marginal external cost:  
1 2( )
NE
At b Xβ β= + + .  
Similarly, region B solves:  
2
0
( ) ( ) 0.5 ( )
B
X
X X
B B B
t
Max p z dz g X X t X mγ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦∫  
Using the equilibrium condition that generalized price equals generalized cost, we easily 
show that the first order condition implies that region B charges exactly the ‘total’ 
marginal external cost, i.e., it charges for the congestion externality in both regions: 
 ( )NEB A Bt Xβ β= +  
The Nash equilibrium tolls are derived as in previous section. We find:  
 
( )
2 3 3
( )
2 3 3
NE A B
A A B A B
A B
NE A B
B A B A B
A B
bt a m m
b
t a m m
b
β β α αβ β
β β α αβ β
+ += − − + ++ +
+= − − + ++ +
         (31) 
Two points are worth noting. First, comparing with (9) we observe that, for given quality 
levels, region A charges more and region B charges less than in the case both regions 
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 were maximizing toll revenues. Region B charges less because it cares for commuter 
welfare; region A charges more in response, given a negatively sloped reaction function. 
Second, tolls charged by A exceed those for region B: there is tax exporting by the city 
region A (also see De Borger et al. (2007), Ubbels and Verhoef (2008)).  
Demand at the disagreement point is given by:  
 
2 3 3
NE A B A B
A B
a m mX
b
α α
β β
− − + += + +            (32) 
Using (31) and (32) in the respective objective functions, the welfare levels at the 
Nash disagreement point are shown to be, for given quality levels: 
 
( )
( )
2 2
2 2
( , ) ( ) 0.5 ( )
( , ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
NE NE
A A B A B A A
NE NE
B A B A B B B
W m m b X m
W m m b X m
β β γ
β β γ
= + + −
= + + −         (33) 
For equal quality cost parameters and quality levels, region A has a stronger pre-
bargaining position. The reason is that, for given investment levels, it charges a higher 
toll than B and hence has larger revenues. Region B is weaker a priori because it wants a 
lower toll than A to account for commuter surplus. Interestingly, therefore, caring for 
consumers weakens region B’s pre-bargaining position.  
The effect of more quality by region A on its bargaining position is given by: 
( )2
( )
2 3 3
NE NE
A B A B A B
A A
A A A B
W W b a m m m
m m b
α α γβ β
∂ ∂ − − + +− = −∂ ∂ + +  
Offering more road quality raises A’s bargaining position if quality costs are low. In that 
case, more quality raises costs, but also increases demand, which raises revenues. Since 
A charges a higher toll than B the latter dominates if quality is not too costly. Similarly, 
we find for the effect of investment by B on its bargaining position: 
( )2
( )
2 3 3
NE NE
B A A B A B
B B
B B A B
W W b a m m m
m m b
α α γβ β
∂ ∂ − − + +− = − −∂ ∂ + +  
Offering better road quality always reduces B’s bargaining position. It is costly and raises 
revenue more for region A than for B, weakening B’s position.  
 Finally, let us turn to the pre-bargaining quality investment game. Country A 
decides on quality by maximizing: 
 { }* 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
NE NE
A A B A B A A B B A BW m m W m m W m m W m m= + −  
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 The first order condition for region A implies the following reaction function in quality: 
( )2
( ) 1,
2 2 2 2 2 3 3
A B A A
A B A
A A A A A B A B
a Z Z bm m Z
Z Z b b
α α
γ γ β β β β
− −= + = +− − + + + +         (34) 
Reaction functions are upward sloping by the second-order conditions. A similar problem 
is solved by B. The corresponding reaction function is: 
( )2
( ) 1,
2 2 2 2 2 3 3
A B B B
B A B
B B B B A B A B
a Z Z bm m Z
Z Z b b
α α
γ γ β β β β
− −= + = −− − + + + +         (35) 
Solving for the Nash equilibrium capacities yields: 
 
( )
2
( )
2
NB B A A B
A
A B B A A B
NB A B A B
B
A B B A A B
Z am
Z Z
Z am
Z Z
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
γ α α
γ γ γ γ
− −= − −
− −= − −
            (36) 
Note that, since A BZ Z> it follows that, assuming equal quality investment costs, the city 
region, interested in only its toll revenue, will actually invest more: NB NBA Bm m> .  The 
intuition is clear. If a region invests in more quality this is translated in more demand and 
hence higher tolls in both regions, but given the toll rules more so in A than B. The 
higher toll, however, reduces consumer surplus for commuters; hence, region B has an 
incentive to invest less in quality than A.    
The bargaining position of A is captured by NE NEA BW W− , where both are evaluated 
at the bargaining quality outcomes. We find, using (36) in (33): 
( ) ( )
2 2
2 2
( ) 40.5 ( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
NE NE A B A B A B
A B A B B A
A B A B B A A B
aW W Z Z
Z Z b
γ γ α α γ γ γ γγ γ γ γ β β
⎡ ⎤ ⎧ ⎫− − ⎪ ⎪− = + −⎢ ⎥ ⎨ ⎬− − + +⎢ ⎥ ⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎩ ⎭
 
Note that this expression is always positive, unless the capacity cost parameter in B is 
very large. This makes sense: under ‘normal’ conditions A has a stronger bargaining 
position than B, as argued before. However, if the capacity cost in B is very high then B 
has a stronger position: it invests much less in quality, leading to lower demand but also 
lower tolls. Given the regions’ pricing policies this effect is more important for A than for 
B. Moreover, the toll reduction is appreciated by B because it raises consumer surplus of 
commuters. Both factors reduce the city region’s relative position. 
Toll levels at the Nash bargaining solution are: 
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 2 ( )
2 2 2
NB NB A B A B A B
A B
A A A B B A A A
at t
b Z Z
β β γ γ α α
β β γ γ γ γ
⎡ ⎤+ − −+ = ⎢ ⎥+ + − −⎣ ⎦
         (37) 
Demand is given by 
[ ]( )
2 ( )
2 2 2
NB A B A B
A B B A A B A A
aX
Z Z b
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ β β
− −= − − + +  
 
B. Comparison of regimes 
 
 In Appendix 2 we work out the analytics of full cooperation and full competition, 
and we provide details on the comparison of the results between the three regimes. The 
various comparisons of tolls, qualities, welfare levels, etc. are algebraically cumbersome, 
but the final results are quite similar to previous findings in Section 2. They are 
summarized in Table 5.  
 The main insight from this section is that bargaining partially resolves problems 
typically associated with tax and investment competition. The literature has shown that 
(see, e.g., De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007) and Ubbels and Verhoef (2008)) Nash 
competition in both tolls and investment implies excessively high tolls and insufficient 
investment compared to the first best fully cooperative optimum, implying substantial 
welfare losses. We find that partial cooperation through Nash bargaining yields more 
investment, lower tolls and higher welfare than fully non-cooperative behavior. However, 
as regions use investment to affect their pre-bargaining position, welfare losses compared 
to the first-best do remain.  
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 Table 5: Comparison between regimes 
 Comparison Nash 
bargaining (NB), 
full cooperation 
(FC) and Full Nash 
Competition (NE) 
Total toll per trip FC>NB 
NE>FC, unless 
demand very elastic 
and not much 
congestion 
Quality investment FC>NB>NE 
Demand (and 
congestion, and 
consumer surplus) 
FC>NB>NE 
Welfare FC>NB>NE 
 
 
3.2. Maximizing welfare: toll and capacity investment under Nash bargaining 
Finally, we considered a model with welfare maximizing regions and investment 
in road capacity. As before, generalized cost functions are: 
 
1( ) ( ), ,
1( ) ( ), ,
A A A A A A A A
A A
B B B B B B B B
B B
XC q q q XR R
K K
XC q q q XR R
K K
α β
α β
= + = = =
= + = = =
 
We showed in Section 2 that the demand function for traffic is: 
 ( , , , ) ,A B A BA B A B A A B B
a t tX t t R R N b R R
N
α α β β− − − −= = + +  
The regions welfare functions can now be written as, respectively:  
0
( ) ( )
A
A A
A
X
X X B
B B
B
kW t X
R
kW p z dz g X X t X
R
= −
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦∫
 
 The main difference with earlier analysis is that no closed-form solutions are 
available for optimal capacities, neither under bargaining nor under Nash competition. 
However, to the extent that analytical results can be derived, they are similar to those in 
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 previous sections. This suggests that many of the results of previous sections are likely to 
carry over to this case, but that only numerical analysis can provide more information. 
We briefly go over the main steps of the analysis. 
 
A. Nash bargaining 
 
Nash bargaining: the tolling stage 
 
Let the regions maximize joint welfare:  
 
,
0
( ) ( )
A B
X
X X A B
A B A Bt t
A B
k kMax W W p z dz g X X t X t X
R R
⎡ ⎤+ = − + + − −⎣ ⎦∫   
The first order conditions immediately imply the first-best toll regime: 
 ( )A B A A B Bt t R R Xβ β+ = +  
This amounts to charging the total marginal external cost of the commuting trip in both 
regions.  
 Using the demand function this can be rewritten as 
[ ]( )
( 2 2 )
A A B B
A B A B
A A B B
R Rt t a
b R R
β β α αβ β
++ = − −+ +  
Unlike in case of revenue maximizing governments, the joint toll level now does depend 
on capacity provision. One easily shows that more capacity, since it reduces congestion, 
leads to lower tolls. Demand is, substituting toll levels:  
 ( )
( 2 2 )
NB A B
A A B B
aX
b R R
α α
β β
− −= + +  
Total joint welfare equals, after substituting in the objective function: 
2( )1( , )
2
A B A B
A B
A A B B A B
a k kW R R
b R R R R
α α
β β
⎛ ⎞− −= − −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 
 
Nash bargaining: the disagreement point 
 
The disagreement point is the Nash equilibrium in tolls. Country A’s first order condition 
implies:  
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  ( )A A A B Bt bX R R Xβ β= + +  
implying that a revenue maximizing city charges more than the overall marginal external 
cost. The implied reaction function is easily derived as: 
 1
2 2
A B
A B
at tα α− −= −  
The first order condition for region B implies:  
( )B A A B Bt R R Xβ β= +  
The reaction function is: 
 [ ]( ) ( )
( 2 2 ) ( 2 2 )
A A B B A A B B
B A B A
A A B B A A B B
R R R Rt a t
b R R b R R
β β β βα αβ β β β
+ += − − −+ + + +  
Solving yields the Nash equilibrium tolls 
 
[ ]
[ ]
2 3 3
2 3 3
NE A A B B
A A B
A A B B
NE A A B B
B A B
A A B B
b R Rt a
b R R
R Rt a
b R R
β β α αβ β
β β α αβ β
+ += − −+ +
+= − −+ +
 
Note that NE NEA Bt t> . Traffic at the Nash equilibrium is: 
2 3 3
A B
A A B B
aX
b R R
α α
β β
− −= + +  
The welfare levels at the Nash disagreement levels are 
 
2
2
( , ) ( )
2 3 3
1( , ) ( 2 2 )
2 2 3 3
NE A B A
A A B A A B B
A A B B A
NE A B B
B A B A A B B
A A B B B
a kW R R b R R
b R R R
a kW R R b R R
b R R R
α αβ β β β
α αβ β β β
⎡ ⎤− −= + + −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −= + + −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
 
Note by simple differentiation that more capacity in region A raises welfare in B (it raises 
congestion in B but also toll levels); the same holds in the other direction.   
 Note that, for equal quality cost parameters and quality levels, region A has again 
a stronger pre-bargaining position. The reason is that, for given investment levels, it 
charges a higher toll than B and hence has larger revenues. Region B is weaker a priori 
because it wants a lower toll than A to account for commuter surplus. The effect of 
inverse capacity for region A on its bargaining position is given by: 
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 ( )2 2
3 ( )
2 3 3
NE NE
A B A A B A
A A AA A B B
W W b a k
R R Rb R R
β α α
β β
∂ ∂ − − −− = +∂ ∂ + +  
Offering more road capacity raises A’s bargaining position if quality costs are low. In 
that case, more quality raises costs, but also increases demand, which raises revenues. 
Since A charges a higher toll than B the latter dominates if quality is not too costly. 
Similarly, we find for the effect of investment by B on its bargaining position: 
( )2 2
3 ( )
2 3 3
NE NE
B A B A B B
B B BA A B B
W W b a k
R R Rb R R
β α α
β β
∂ ∂ − −− = +∂ ∂ + +  
Offering more road capacity always reduces B’s bargaining position. It is costly and 
raises revenue more for region A than for B, weakening B’s position.  
 
The pre- bargaining capacity game  
 
Region A solves: 
 { }* 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2
NE NE
A A B A B A A B B A BW R R W R R W R R W R R= + −  
Using the results given above, the objective function for region A in deciding on its 
capacity investment can be rewritten as follows, after simple algebra: 
[ ] ( )
2*
2
1 1( , ) 2
2 2 3 3A
A
A A B A BR
A A B B AA A B B
kbMax W R R a
b R R Rb R R
α α β β β β
⎛ ⎞= − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎝ ⎠
 
The first order condition implies: 
( ) ( )
*
2
2 3 2
1 6( ) 2 0
2 2 3 3
A A A
A AA A B B A A B B
W kbJ
R Rb R R b R R
β
β β β β
⎡ ⎤∂ = − + + =⎢ ⎥∂ + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Using the implicit function theorem and the second order condition it immediately 
follows that the implied reaction function in inverse capacities is upward sloping. 
Unfortunately, no the reaction function is highly nonlinear and cannot be expressed in 
closed form. Similarly, we find for B: 
( ) ( )
*
2
2 3 2
1 6( ) 2 0
2 2 3 3
B B B
B BA A B B A A B B
W kbJ
R Rb R R b R R
β
β β β β
⎡ ⎤∂ = − − + =⎢ ⎥∂ + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The implied reaction function is also upward sloping.  
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  The set of reaction functions imply, assuming equal investment costs and 
congestion levels in both regions, that the city region A offers more capacity, just as in 
the case of revenue maximizing governments. Since no explicit solution for inverse 
capacities can be derived, the dependency of the relative bargaining strengths on 
parameters cannot be derived analytically either.   
  
B. Full cooperation 
 
 Full cooperation leads to the following first order conditions: 
( )
( )
2
2 2
2
2 2
1( ) 0
2
1( ) 0
2
A A
A AA A B B
B B
B BA A B B
kW J
R Rb R R
kW J
R Rb R R
β
β β
β
β β
⎡ ⎤∂ = − + =⎢ ⎥∂ + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤∂ = − + =⎢ ⎥∂ + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
C. Full competition 
 
 Nash equilibrium capacities cannot be determines analytically either. For 
example, the first order condition for region A can be written as: 
( )
2
3 2
4 3 3( ) 0
2 3 3
NE
A A A B B A
A
A AA A B B
W b R R kJ
R Rb R R
β ββ β β
⎡ ⎤∂ + += − + =⎢ ⎥∂ + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
It is highly nonlinear in inverse capacities.  
 
D. Comparison 
 
 Although no explicit solutions are available, we can show that the ranking of 
capacities is the same as before in Section 2. To show this, assume that the first-order 
condition for region A under full cooperation holds, i.e.: 
 ( )
2
2 2
1( ) 0
2
A A
A AA A B B
kW J
R Rb R R
β
β β
⎡ ⎤∂ = − + =⎢ ⎥∂ + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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 Using the first order condition under Nash bargaining this information is shown to imply 
that  
   
*
0A
A
W
R
∂ >∂  
This means that the relations describing the first order conditions for region A under 
bargaining and full competition do not intersect, and that the reaction function under 
bargaining lies above the condition under full cooperation. A similar exercise for region 
B then yields the outcome that the equilibrium capacities under bargaining are below 
those under full cooperation, just as in Section 2. 
 
4. A numerical example 
We consider a simple numerical example of the tolling and capacity case 
considered for welfare maximizing governments. This case (section 3.2) did not yield an 
analytical solution. The setting is as in Ubbels and Verhoef (2008). Assume a city (A) is 
surrounded by a region (B). Let the distances all users drive be as in the following figure: 
 
<---------10km-----------------><------------------------------20km-------------------------------> 
                   A             B 
 
4.1 Calibration of the reference situation 
Assume current demand is X=500. Given the design of the roads, free flowing 
speeds are 50 and 100 kilometer per hour in A and B, respectively. Currently measured 
average speeds amount to 20 and 50, respectively.  The price elasticity of demand with 
respect to the generalized price is assumed to be -0.25. Moreover, capacities in the two 
regions are given by 800, 1000A BK K= = , respectively. Current toll levels are zero. 
The cost functions to be calibrated are 
 
( )
( )
1,
1,
A A A A A
A
B B B B B
B
C XR R
K
C XR R
K
α β
α β
= + =
= + =
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 Assume the monetary cost is 0.1 euro per kilometer, and let time values amount to 10 
euro per hour. Then the parameters ,A Bα α reflect the monetary plus time cost at freely 
flowing traffic. Given the information above, they can be calibrated as: 3, 4A Bα α= = 11 
The money plus time costs at the current traffic flow are easily determined as 
follows. First consider region A. Each driver faces the monetary cost of 1 euro, plus a 
time cost equal to 5 euro: 10 kilometers at 20km/hour is 0.5 hours, times 10 euro per hour 
yields 5 euro. Therefore, we have 3 (500 / 800) 6A AC β= + = . This gives 4.8Aβ = . So we 
have 3 4.8( )A AC XR= + . Similarly, a driver in B faces currently a monetary cost of 2 euro 
plus a time cost, given average speed of 50 km/hour, of 4 euro. Hence,  
4 (500 /1000) 6B BC β= + =  or 4Bβ = , and 4 4( )B BC XR= + . 
The inverse demand function is 
 p a bX= −  
where p is the generalized price. Given the current generalized costs in A and B equal to 
6 and 6, respectively, the reference p=12. Combining with observed demand X=500 and 
assuming a price elasticity of -0.25, this allows us to calibrate the demand function as: 
 15 0.006p X= −   
Finally, to calibrate reasonable capacity cost parameters we assumed that the 
currently observed equilibrium is the optimal outcome of the Nash competition model at 
very low toll levels. The capacity costs obtained were: 0.3, 0.25A Bk k= = . 
 
4.2. Numerical results 
 In Table 5 we summarize the results of the numerical analysis. We determined 
optimal toll and capacity levels under full cooperation (FC), Nash bargaining (NB) and 
the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution (NE). 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 To see this, take A as an example. The cost for traveling the 10 kilometer through A at freely flowing 
traffic amounts to 1 euro (monetary cost) plus 2 euro (50 kilometer per hour implies 10 kilometer takes 0.2 
hours, times 10 euro per hour is 2 euro).    
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  Reference Full 
cooperation 
(FC) 
Nash 
bargaining 
(NB) 
Full non-
cooperative 
competition 
(NE) 
Toll A+B 0 1.73 2.84 5.07 
Toll A 0   2.92 
Toll B 0   2.15 
Capacity A 800 3866 1289 564 
Capacity B 1000 3866 1095 490 
Traffic level X 500 758 385 129 
Welfare Gain 
relative to 
reference for 
A+B 
0 100 95 31 
Table 5: numerical results 
 
 The results are easily interpreted. First, non-cooperative behavior implies an 
enormous increase in toll levels due to tax competition. Cooperation at both the tolling 
and capacity stage implies a toll of 1.73 euro in order to capture marginal external 
congestion costs, which are unaccounted for in the reference. Second, observe that the 
Nash bargaining approach to partial cooperation produces much less extreme results 
compared to non-cooperative behavior. It implies a somewhat higher toll compared to 
full cooperation, and capacity levels rise only moderately compared to the reference. 
Since offering more capacity raises A’s bargaining power, more capacity of offered by A 
than B. By investing more regions A secures a larger share of the toll revenues. Third and 
most importantly, note that the relative welfare gain of the Nash bargaining solution is 
relatively close to the first best outcome of full cooperation: it attains 95% of the welfare 
gain the first best attains, relative to the reference case of un-tolled congestion. Non-
cooperative behavior only produces, through charging for congestion, a moderate gain of 
some 31% of the maximum attainable gain.  
 Although the example is extremely simple, what these findings might suggest is 
that partial cooperation may in fact lead to welfare results that are far less dramatic than 
aggressive competitive behavior. If this is the case, and given that bargaining between 
36
 governments is the rule rather than the exception, welfare results may be much less 
averse than suggested by some recent literature.      
 
5. Concluding comments 
We presented a model of partial cooperation between regions or countries in toll 
and investment (both quality and capacity investments are considered) setting along a 
serial transport corridor, where each link is operated by a different government. To study 
partial cooperation, we assumed that countries cooperate at the tolling stage and negotiate 
over the distribution of the net benefits knowing that, if no bargaining agreement is 
reached, they fall back at the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative tolling game. At 
the investment stage of the game, countries then strategically compete in order to ensure 
a better bargaining position and to get a larger share of the net benefits of the policy 
decisions. We compared the results with those of full cooperation and full competition at 
both stages of the game.  
Findings of this paper include the following. First, in a model of toll and quality 
competition, we find that regions’ relative bargaining positions positively depend on the 
cost of quality: the region where the cost of quality is higher has the strongest position. 
Intuitively, the specification of the investment cost function implies that a higher 
marginal quality cost reduces investment spending, increasing (net of capacity costs) toll 
revenues. Second, considering a model of toll and capacity decisions we find that a 
region’s pre-bargaining position negatively depends on both the slope of the congestion 
function and on the unit cost of capacity. Third, partial cooperation implies lower tolls 
and higher quality and capacity investment than under the full Nash equilibrium in both 
tolls and capacities. Fourth, the region concerned about user welfare weakens its 
bargaining position. Finally, partial cooperation (Nash bargaining) yields higher welfare 
than full Nash competition. Partial cooperation therefore substantially reduces the welfare 
loss associated with fierce toll and capacity competition under full Nash competition, as 
pointed out in the recent literature. Of course, since partial cooperation still does not 
achieve the first best, some welfare losses do remain. 
 Extensions to the analysis of this paper include the following. First, although the 
idea of partial cooperation is applicable to many other setting as well, a more complete 
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 model is needed to guarantee the generality of the results. For example, our model 
focused on through traffic only and ignored local transport. Second, more detailed 
numerical analysis might provide information on the remaining welfare losses of partial 
cooperation. Third, empirical work may be needed to provide evidence on the relevance 
of bargained outcomes in tax and capacity competition issues.  
 
38
 References 
 
d’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in duopoly 
with spillovers, American Economic Review 78 (5), 1988, 1133-1137.  
 
Borck, R. and M. Pflüger, Agglomeration and tax competition, European Economic 
Review 2006 
 
Brod, A. and R. Shivakumar, Advantageous semi-collusion, The Journal of Industrial 
Economics XLVII (2), 1999, 221-230. 
 
De Borger, B., Dunkerley, F. and S. Proost, Strategic investment and pricing decisions in 
a congested transport corridor, Journal of Urban Economics 62 (2), 2007, 294-316.  
 
De Borger, B., Dunkerley, F. and S. Proost, The interaction between tolls and capacity 
investment in parallel and serial transport networks, Review of Network Economics 7, 
2008, 136-158. 
 
De Borger, B., Proost, S. and K. Van Dender, Congestion and tax competition on a 
parallel network, European Economic Review 49 (8), 2005, 2013-2040. 
 
de Palma, A. and L. Leruth, Congestion and game in capacity: a duopoly analysis in the 
presence of network externalities, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 15/16, 1989, 
389-407. 
 
Fershtman, C. and E. Muller, Capital investments and price agreements in semi-collusive 
markets, Rand Journal of Economics 17 (2), 1986, 214-226. 
 
Han, S. and J. Leach, A bargaining model of tax competition, Journal of Public 
Economics 92, 2008, 1122-1141. 
 
Janeba, E., Tax competition when governments lack commitment, American Economic 
Review 2000 
 
Kanbur, A. and M. Keen, Jeux sans frontières: tax competition when countries differ in 
size, American Economic Review 83, 1993, 877-892. 
 
Keen, M. and C. Kotsiogannis, Leviathan and capital tax competition in federations, 
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2003 
 
Levinson, D., Why States Toll – An empirical model of finance choice, Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy 35 (2), 2001, 223-238 
 
Mintz, J. and H. Tulkens, Commodity taxation between member states of a federation: 
equilibrium and efficiency, Journal of Public Economics 29, 1986, 173-197. 
39
  
Nash, J.F., The bargaining problem, Econometrica 18, 1950, 155-162. 
 
Parry, I., How large are the welfare costs of tax competition?, Journal of Urban 
Economics 54, 2003, 39-60. 
 
Pauwels, W. and P. Kort, R&D investments in semicollusive markets with bargaining 
between asymmetric firms, Working paper, Department of Economics, University of 
Antwerp, 2008 
 
Salvanes, K.G., Steen, F. and L. Sorgard, Collude, compete or both, Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy 37 (3), 2003, 383-416. 
 
Sorensen, P., Tax coordination: its desirability and redistributional implications, 
Economic Policy 15, 2000, 431-472. 
 
Ubbels, B. and E. Verhoef, Governmental competition in road charging and capacity 
choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2008 
 
Wilson, J.S., Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal LII, 1999, 269-304. 
 
Wilson, J.D. and D. Wildasin, Capital tax competition: bane or boon, Journal of Public 
Economics 2004 
 
Zodrow, G.R., Tax competition and tax coordination in the European Union, 
International Tax and Public Finance 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
40
 Appendix 1: the case of capacity investment for revenue maximizing regions.  
 
In this appendix, we provide details on the cases of full cooperation and full Nash 
competition. 
 
Full cooperation at both capacity and tolling stages 
 
Maximal joint net toll revenues were given by, conditional on capacity levels: 
 
21 1 1( , ) ( ) ( )
2
A B
A B A B
A A B B A B
aR R k k
b R R R R
α αϕ β β
⎛ ⎞ − −⎡ ⎤= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
If the two countries cooperate at both stages, they maximize this objective function with 
respect to both capacities. The first order conditions can be written as: 
 
( )
( )
2
2
A A B B A
A
A B A
A A B B B
B
A B B
b R R kR
a
b R R kR
a
β β
α α β
β β
α α β
⎛ ⎞+ += ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ += ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − ⎝ ⎠
 
Solving yields the optimal fully cooperative capacities: 
( )
( )
2
2
2
2
A
AFC
A
A B A A B B
B
BFC
B
A B A A B B
kb
R
a k k
kb
R
a k k
β
α α β β
β
α α β β
= − − − +
= − − − +
 
Substituting into the joint objective function yields optimal joint net revenues: 
2
( ) 2( )
( , )
4
A B A A A AFC FC
A B
a k k
R R
b
α α β βϕ
⎡ ⎤− − − +⎣ ⎦=  
 
Welfare depends on demand only. This is given by:  
( )2
2
A B A A B BFC
a k k
X
b
α α β β− − − +=  
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Nash equilibrium in both tolls and capacities: full competition 
 
If countries compete in both tolls and capacities, then they maximize the Nash 
equilibrium profit, obtained for the Nash equilibrium tolls, conditional on capacities. 
These were given by, for A and B respectively:  
2
2
1 1( , ) ( )
3
1 1( , ) ( )
3
NE A B
A A B A
A A B B A
NE A B
B A B B
A A B B B
aR R k
b R R R
aR R k
b R R R
α αϕ β β
α αϕ β β
⎛ ⎞ − −⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ − −⎡ ⎤= −⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥+ + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
This leads to the Nash equilibrium capacities: 
( )
( )
3
3
3
3
A
ANE
A
A B A A B B
B
BNE
B
A B A A B B
kb
R
a k k
kb
R
a k k
β
α α β β
β
α α β β
= − − − +
= − − − +
 
The regions’ net revenues are, respectively: 
( ) 3( ) ( ) 3
3 3
( ) 3( ) ( ) 3
3 3
A B A A B B A B A ANE
A
A B A A B B A B B BNE
B
a k k a k
b
a k k a k
b
α α β β α α βϕ
α α β β α α βϕ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − + − − −= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − + − − −= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
They get less if they have higher capacity costs or congestion. Total net toll revenues 
under this regime are: 
2
( ) 3( )1
3
A B A A B BNE NE NE
A B
a k k
b
α α β βϕ ϕ ϕ ⎡ ⎤− − − +⎛ ⎞= + = ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Demand is given by: 
( )3
3
A B A A B BNE
a k k
X
b
α α β β− − − +=  
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 Appendix 2. Comparison between regimes: welfare maximizing governments  
 
 In this appendix we work out the other regimes (full cooperation and full 
competition) and compare with the results for Nash bargaining.  
First, consider full cooperation. Maximal joint welfare with respect to both quality 
levels yields the optimal fully cooperative levels: 
( )
( 2 2 ) ( )
( )
( 2 2 ) ( )
FC B A B
A
A B A B A B
FC A A B
B
A B A B A B
am
b
am
b
γ α α
γ γ β β γ γ
γ α α
γ γ β β γ γ
− −= + + − +
− −= + + − +
 
Tolls at the full cooperative equilibrium are: 
( ) ( )
( 2 2 ) ( )
FC FC A B A B
A B A B
A B A B A B
at t
b
γ γ α αβ β γ γ β β γ γ
− −+ = + + + − +  
Demand is given by 
 ( )
( 2 2 ) ( )
FC A B A B
A B A B A B
aX
b
γ γ α α
γ γ β β γ γ
− −= + + − +  
 
 Second, if countries compete in both tolls and qualities, then they maximize the 
Nash equilibrium welfare, conditional on qualities. The relevant expressions were given 
in the main body of the paper, for A and B respectively. Working out the first order 
conditions for region A, its reaction function can be written as: 
( )2
( ) 2( ),
2 3 3
A B A A A B
A B A
A A A A A B
a Q Q bm m Q
Q Q b
α α β β
γ γ β β
− − + += + =− − + +       (A1) 
Similarly, we find for B: 
( )2
( ) 2 2,
2 3 3
A B B B A B
B B B
B B B B A B
a Q Q bm m Q
Q Q b
α α β β
γ γ β β
− − + += + =− − + +          (A2)  
This leads to the Nash equilibrium qualities: 
( ) ( );NE NEB A A B A B A BA B
A B A B B A A B A B B A
Q a Q am m
Q Q Q Q
γ α α γ α α
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
− − − −= =− − − −  
This implies the city region offers more quality than the regional authority. Substituting 
in the Nash demand function we have: 
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 [ ][ ]
( )
2 3 3
NE A B A B
A B A B B A A B
aX
Q Q b
γ γ α α
γ γ γ γ β β
− −= − − + +  
Finally, the toll per trip is: 
 [ ][ ] [ ]
2 2 ( )
2 3 3
A BNE NE A B A B
A B
A B A B A B B A
b at t
b Q Q
β β γ γ α α
β β γ γ γ γ
+ + − −+ = + + − −  
 
Comparing the results under the three regimes, let us start with investment in 
quality. It is straightforward to show that bargaining implies lower quality than full 
cooperation. To compare bargaining with full competition, the key point to note is that 
both the intercept and the slopes of the reaction functions of the capacity game under 
bargaining and Nash competition can be directly compared. For example, the relative 
intercepts and slopes of the reaction functions for A depend on the comparison of  
 
2
A
A A
Z
Zγ −  and 
A
A A
Q
Qγ −  
Using the relevant definitions (see (34) and (A1)) it immediately follows that Nash 
competition implies both a lower intercept and lower slope that bargaining. A similar 
reasoning holds for the reaction functions for B. Since the reaction functions are linear, 
this implies that    
 FC NB NEA A Am m m> >  
FC NB NE
B B Bm m m> >  
 
Next consider demand under the different regimes. We find again that  
FC NB NEX X X> >  
To see this, direct comparison yields, after some simple algebra, that  
 FC NBX X>  
where the difference is smallest when we have B Aγ γ>  and this difference is large. In that 
case B has large bargaining power and can obtain better outcomes for commuter welfare. 
Toll rules are the same under these regimes, but more overall quality is offered under 
cooperation. This implies also that from the consumer’s viewpoint cooperation is always 
better than bargained outcomes, but that the difference is smallest when region B has 
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 substantial bargaining power; this happens when its marginal quality cost is much larger 
than for than for A.  
To show that demand will be higher under bargaining than full competition, use 
(4) to write: 
1 ( )NB NE NB NB NE NE NB NB NE NEA B A B A B A BX X m m m m t t t tN
⎡ ⎤− = + − − − + − −⎣ ⎦  
Substituting the toll rules:  
( )
( 2 2 )
NB NB NB
A B A B
NE NE NE
A B A B
t t X
t t b X
β β
β β
+ = +
+ = + +  
into this expression and working out, we have: 
1 ( )
2 2
NB NE NB NB NE NE NB
A B A B A B
A B
X X m m m m b X
b
β ββ β ⎡ ⎤− = + − − + + +⎣ ⎦+ +  
This is necessarily positive, since more quality is offered under bargaining than 
competition.  
 Next, let us compare toll levels. Note that the toll rules are the same under full 
cooperation and bargaining, but more overall quality is offered under cooperation. So the 
toll per trip is higher under full cooperation than under bargaining: 
FC FC NB NB
A B A Bt t t t+ > +  
One expects the toll per trip under competition to be higher than the first-best toll, given 
that competition, conditional on demand, implies a toll which largely exceeds marginal 
external congestion cost. However, it also yields lower demand. To appreciate this start 
from the rules: 
( )
( 2 2 )
FC FC FC
A B A B
NE NE NE
A B A B
t t X
t t b X
β β
β β
+ = +
+ = + +  
For given demand, tolls are much higher under full competition than bargaining, but 
demand is lower (see above), reducing tolls. The toll difference can be written as:   
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )FC FC NE NE FC NE NEA B A B A B A Bt t t t X X b Xβ β β β+ − + = + − − + +  
The first term on the right hand side is positive, the second negative. Surprisingly, we 
were unable to show in general that the competitive toll exceeds the first best toll. The 
same holds for the comparison with bargaining tolls. Clearly, if there is no congestion, 
the expression is negative and tolls are higher under competition. The same holds if 
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 demand is not very elastic (large b). In general, competitive tolls are highest unless 
demand is very elastic and there is little congestion.  
 Finally, by definition welfare is highest under full cooperation. To show that 
bargaining yields higher welfare than full non-cooperative behavior, remember that total 
welfare can be written in general:  
2 2
0
( ) ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
X
X X
A B A A B Bp z dz g X X t X t X m mγ γ⎡ ⎤− + + − −⎣ ⎦∫  
Working out, using the demand specification and the equality of generalized price and 
generalized cost, we can write this as: 
2 2 2( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
2 A B A A B B
b X t t X m mγ γ+ + − −  
Using the respective toll rules under bargaining and competition total welfare under both 
regimes can be written, respectively: 
 2 2 21 ( 2 2 )( ) ( ) ( )
2
NB NB NB NB
A B A A B BW b X m mβ β γ γ⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦  
2 2 21 (3 4 4 )( ) ( ) ( )
2
NE NE NE NE
A B A A B BW X m mβ β γ γ⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦  
Now note that  
 
, ( ) 0
2 2
2 3 3
NB NB
NB A B
A B
A B
NE NE
NE A B
A B
J m mX J a
b
J m mX
b
α αβ β
β β
+ += = − − >+ +
+ += + +
 
Using these expressions, welfare can be reformulated as, respectively:  
( ) ( )2 2 21 1 * 2 2 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )2NB NB NB NB NB NB NB NB NBA B A B A A B BNBW J m m J m m M m M mM γ γ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + + + + − + −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( )2 2 21 1 2 2 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )2NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NBA B A B A A B BNEW J m m J m m M m M mM γ γ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + + + + − + −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
where 
2 2NB A BM b β β= + +  
( )22 3 3
3 4 4
A BNE
A B
M
b
β β
β β
+ += + +  
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 Using ,NB NE NB NEA A B Bm m m m> > , and noting that NB NEM M< it immediately follows that 
welfare under bargaining is higher than under full competition.  
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